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POLICING THE IMMIGRATION POLICE: ICE 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
Jason A. Cade∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
A persistent puzzle in immigration law is how the removal 
adjudication system should respond to the increasing prevalence of 
violations of noncitizens’ constitutional rights by arresting officers. 
Scholarship in this area has focused on judicial suppression of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, typically by arguing that the 
Supreme Court should overrule its 1984 decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza 
not to enforce the exclusionary rule in civil immigration court. This 
Essay, in contrast, considers the role of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) attorneys in upholding the Fourth Amendment, 
taking as a launching point the recent exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion by ICE attorneys in Charlotte, North Carolina, in cases arising 
from systemic unlawful policing.  
Part I briefly describes how ICE lawyers (also called “Trial Attorneys” 
or “ICE prosecutors”) in the Charlotte Immigration Court have closed 
deportation cases against noncitizens arrested through unlawful policing 
by local officers in North Carolina, following a Department of Justice 
(DOJ) report on the discriminatory targeting of Latinos in Alamance 
County, North Carolina. The Essay then explores two potential bases for 
an ICE prosecutor’s decision to take remedial action when arresting 
officers violate the constitution. First, Part II examines ICE prosecutors’ 
constitutional responsibilities as executive branch attorneys in light of 
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the Supreme Court’s decision to underenforce the Fourth Amendment 
in the context of immigration arrests. Part III then considers whether 
ICE’s remedial actions in North Carolina comport with internal agency 
guidelines for exercising prosecutorial discretion in deportation cases.  
I. CHARLOTTE ICE ATTORNEYS’ REMEDIAL ACTIONS FOLLOWING 
UNLAWFUL POLICING BY LOCAL OFFICERS 
On September 18, 2012, the DOJ announced that its two-year 
investigation of law enforcement practices in Alamance County, North 
Carolina, had uncovered pervasive discriminatory policing against 
Latinos by Sheriff Terry S. Johnson and his deputies.1 The report 
concluded that Sheriff Johnson fostered a culture of police bias against 
Latinos, directing police to “go out there and get me some of those taco 
eaters” or to “bring me some Mexicans.”2 Among other findings, 
deputies were between four and ten times more likely to stop Latino 
drivers on major county roadways, to target Latino communities with 
vehicle checkpoints, and to arrest Latinos for minor traffic violations 
while issuing citations or warnings to non-Latinos for comparable 
violations.3 The DOJ also found discrimination in the county’s booking 
and detention practices related to immigration status checks.4 
The Alamance County Sheriff’s Office is not the only law 
enforcement agency to have engaged in unlawful police practices against 
immigrants. Recent reports suggest correlations between an increased 
local role in immigration enforcement and routine Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment violations.5 The DOJ has found systemic police abuses 
                                                 
1. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Releases Investigative 
Findings on the Alamance County, N.C., Sheriff’s Office (Sept. 18, 2012) [hereinafter 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Findings], http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/September/12-crt-
1125.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
2. Anne Blythe, U.S. Justice Department Sues Alamance County Sheriff, Accusing 
Him of Discriminating Against Latinos, News & Observer (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.
newsobserver.com/2012/12/20/2557060/us-justice-department-sues-alamance.html (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
3. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Findings, supra note 1. 
4. Id. 
5. See, e.g., Trevor Gardner II & Aarti Kohli, Chief Justice Earl Warren Inst. on Race, 
Ethnicity & Diversity, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE Criminal Alien 
Program 1 (2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_
FINAL.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing correlation between 
implementation of cooperative immigration jail enforcement program in Irving, Texas, 
and dramatic rise in discretionary arrests of Latinos for minor traffic offenses and other 
petty offenses). See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration 
Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 Duke L.J. 1563, 
1615–20 (2010) [hereinafter Chacón, A Diversion of Attention] (summarizing critics’ 
claims that state and local participation in immigration enforcement is leading to 
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similar to those in Alamance County in locations such as Maricopa 
County, Arizona,6 and New Haven, Connecticut.7 Federal officers, too, 
regularly ignore the Fourth Amendment and other constitutional 
protections when making immigration arrests.8  
Policing practices that violate noncitizens’ constitutional rights are 
thus a persistent and growing feature of immigration enforcement. In 
part, this is a predictable consequence of the nature and scale of the 
contemporary enforcement system, which boasts the second-largest 
investigative force in the federal government and substantial integration 
with state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the country.9 
Through a combination of cooperative relationships, data-sharing 
technology, and well-resourced jail screening programs, immigration 
enforcement typically begins with low-level contact with local law 
enforcement and proceeds along a virtually seamless line to federal 
deportation proceedings.10 Additionally, in recent years a number of 
                                                                                                                 
“unprofessional and even illegal policing tactics”); Developments in the Law---Immigrant 
Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1565, 1646 (2013) [hereinafter 
Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement] (discussing how recent developments in 
immigration enforcement “increase the temptation” for state and local officials to violate 
Fourth Amendment). 
6. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Bill 
Montgomery, Maricopa Cnty. Att’y (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/
crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (detailing DOJ’s findings, including that Sheriff Joseph Arpaio’s deputies were 
four to nine times more likely to stop Latinos in their vehicles, frequently detain and 
search Latinos in their cars, homes, and workplaces without legal justification, mistreat 
arrestees with limited English proficiency, and fail to provide police protection to Latino 
residents); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Files Lawsuit in 
Arizona Against Maricopa County, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and Sheriff Joseph 
Arpaio (May 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-crt-602.html (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
7. Peter Applebome, Police Gang Tyrannized Latinos, Indictment Says, N.Y. Times 
(Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/nyregion/connecticut-police-
officers-accused-of-mistreating-latinos.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(discussing arrest of four police officers in East Haven following DOJ investigation of 
mistreatment of immigrants, particularly Latino residents). 
8. See, e.g., Bess Chiu et al., Cardozo Immigration Justice Clinic, Constitution on 
ICE: A Report on Immigration Home Raid Operations 1 (2009), available at 
http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/9780415996945/human-rights/cardozo.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (describing unconstitutional ICE search and seizure 
activities). 
9. See David Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 
91 Tex. L. Rev. 7, 27–31 (2012). 
10. See, e.g., Marc R. Rosenblum & William A. Kandel, Cong. Research Serv., 
R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens 13–19 
(2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42057.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (discussing ICE enforcement programs that target noncitizens who 
encounter state and local criminal justice systems); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, 
Policing Immigration, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 87, 93 (2013) (discussing expansive reach of 
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states have passed legislation authorizing or requiring local authorities to 
enforce federal immigration law11—for example, by verifying the 
immigration status of every person who is stopped, detained, or 
arrested.12 As a result of these developments, state and local officers now 
act as the immigration system’s “force multipliers,”13 arresting four times 
more immigrants referred for removal hearings than federal officers.14  
Significantly, both federal and local officers enforcing immigration 
law have a diminished incentive to comply with the Fourth Amendment 
due to the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza15 not 
to judicially impose the exclusionary rule in civil immigration 
proceedings.16 Since many of these immigration or low-level criminal 
arrests never result in criminal prosecutions, where the exclusionary rule 
does apply (subject to exceptions),17 rights violations go largely 
unchecked and undeterred.18  
                                                                                                                 
Secure Communities biometric information sharing program); Immigrant Rights & 
Immigration Enforcement, supra note 5, at 1645–49 (explaining increasing role of local 
and state officials in immigration enforcement). 
11. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 31-13-6 (Supp. 2012); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051 
(2012); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-5-100(b) (2013); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-100 to -109 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
12. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-5-100; Ind. Code 
Ann. § 5-2-18.2-4 (LexisNexis 2013); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-170 (Supp. 2012); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-1003. 
13. Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of 
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 179 (2005). 
14. Compare Kate M. Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., R42690, Immigration 
Detainers: Legal Issues 8 (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42690.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(reporting ICE issued 201,778 detainers against persons held in local jails following arrests 
by local law enforcement in first eleven months of fiscal year 2010), with John Simanski & 
Lesley M. Sapp, Office of Immigration Statistics, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration 
Enforcement Actions: 2011, at 3 & tbl.1 (2012), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/enforcement
_ar_2011.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting ICE made total of 53,610 
immigration arrests in fiscal year 2010). 
15. 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). 
16. See, e.g., Gray et al., supra note 9, at 27–31 (discussing effect of Lopez-Mendoza on 
officers’ incentives in making immigration arrests). 
17. See generally Ronald J. Allen et al., Comprehensive Criminal Procedure 658–709 
(3d ed. 2011) (discussing scope of exclusionary rule). 
18. Civil rights lawsuits are occasionally filed, of course, and some have been 
successful, but these are cumbersome and expensive, and it is doubtful they deter much 
beyond the most egregious and systematic police misconduct. See Peter Margulies, 
Noncitizens’ Remedies Lost?: Accountability for Overreaching in Immigration 
Enforcement, 6 Fla. Int’l U. L. Rev. 319, 321–22 (2011) (discussing legislatively and 
judicially imposed constraints on availability of damage suits in immigration context); 
Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic Accountability and the Anti-Administrative 
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Following the DOJ’s findings in Alamance County, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) terminated the federal agreement in effect 
with the county that had authorized local enforcement of federal 
immigration laws,19 a measure that DHS has sometimes taken in other 
jurisdictions.20 More surprising, however, were the actions of the Trial 
Attorneys who represent the government in the Charlotte Immigration 
Court. Many of the noncitizens arrested by Sheriff Johnson’s officers 
through unlawful policing practices were already in the federal 
immigration system facing deportation for civil immigration violations. 
After the issuance of the DOJ’s September report, ICE began to 
systematically close deportation proceedings in cases arising in Alamance 
County.21 According to immigration attorney Marty Rosenbluth, who 
represented over a dozen of the affected noncitizens, the Charlotte Trial 
Attorneys exercised favorable discretion in cases that it normally would 
have prosecuted if not for Sheriff Johnson’s discriminatory policing.22 
ICE reportedly declined to proceed against noncitizens apprehended in 
                                                                                                                 
Impulse, in Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences 52, 75 (Michael W. 
Dowdle ed., 2006) (explaining why civil actions seeking judicial enforcement of rights may 
have little deterrence value). 
19. Billy Ball, DOJ Ends Federal Immigration Program in Alamance County, Indy 
Week (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/doj-ends-federal-
immigration-program-in-alamance-county/Content?oid=3157331 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
20. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary 
Napolitano on DOJ’s Findings of Discriminatory Policing in Maricopa County (Dec. 15, 
2011), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/12/15/secretary-napolitano-dojs-findings-
discriminatory-policing-maricopa-county (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(terminating Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office’s 287(g) jail model agreement and 
restricting its access to Secure Communities Program following DOJ’s finding of 
discriminatory policing). 
21. Billy Ball, Deportations Dropped in Alamance County, But How Many?, Indy 
Week (Nov. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Ball, Deportations Dropped], http://www.indyweek.
com/indyweek/deportations-dropped-in-alamance-county-but-how-many/Content?oid=31
97209 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In a telephone interview, Marty Rosenbluth 
stated that with a substantial amount of advocacy he had been able to get ICE to close 
around six Alamance County deportation cases before the DOJ issued its report in 
September, but that following the report these closures became virtually automatic. 
Telephone Interview with Marty Rosenbluth, Exec. Dir. & Att’y, N.C. Immigrant Rights 
Project (Sept. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Marty Rosenbluth] (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
22. Billy Ball, Marty Rosenbluth: Fighting for the Rights of Undocumented 
Immigrants, Indy Week (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/marty-
rosenbluth-fighting-for-the-rights-of-undocumented-immigrants/Content?oid=3255480 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Telephone Interview with Marty Rosenbluth, supra 
note 21. In October, one month after the DOJ’s findings were made public, an ICE 
spokesperson confirmed that cases initiated by Alamance County deputies were being 
dropped; however, the agency apparently has not tracked the total number of such 
decisions. Ball, Deportations Dropped, supra note 21. 
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Alamance County even where they were unrepresented by counsel,23 and 
reopened at least one matter where the respondent had already been 
ordered deported in order to exercise favorable discretion.24 In a 
telephone interview, Rosenbluth stated that later in 2012 the ICE 
prosecutors in Charlotte similarly exercised bulk discretion in a number 
of deportation cases arising from an illegal police traffic checkpoint in 
Jackson County, North Carolina (though, as with the Alamance County 
cases, a significant amount of advocacy by immigrant representatives was 
required).25 
Charlotte ICE is the only regional office known to this author to 
have systematically exercised discretion to remedy upstream 
constitutional violations by state or local authorities.26 As a general 
matter, ICE attorneys have a reputation for zealously pursuing 
immigration cases without significant consideration of humanitarian 
circumstances or other factors that might warrant discretion.27 In 
                                                 
23. Ball, Deportations Dropped, supra note 21; Telephone Interview with Marty 
Rosenbluth, supra note 21. 
24. Chris Lavender, Illegal Immigrant Won’t Face Deportation, Times-News (Feb. 
15, 2013, 4:33 PM), http://www.thetimesnews.com/news/top-news/illegal-immigrant-won-
t-face-deportation-1.96262 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
25. Telephone Interview with Marty Rosenbluth, supra note 21. 
26. In a few rare cases, immigrants have been able to get deportation proceedings 
terminated through lawsuits against ICE for Fourth Amendment violations, but this kind 
of settlement is distinct from the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Landmark 
Settlement in New Haven Immigration Raid Case a Victory for YLS Worker & Immigrant 
Rights Clinic Students, Yale Law Sch. (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.law.yale.edu/news/15003.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting 
in addition to monetary damages, ICE’s settlement of lawsuit alleging unlawful searches 
and seizures in New Haven included dropping any pending deportation proceedings 
against eleven plaintiffs). 
27. See Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Immigration, Reforming the Immigration System: 
Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and Professionalism in the 
Adjudication of Removal Cases 1-25 to 1-29 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_complete_full_re
port.authcheckdam.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting “insufficient use of 
prosecutorial discretion” as systemic issue); Chi. Appleseed Fund for Justice, Assembly 
Line Injustice: Blueprint to Reform America’s Immigration Courts 16–18 (2009), available 
at http://appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Assembly-Line-Injustice-
Blueprint-to-Reform-Americas-Immigration-Courts1.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (noting tendency of ICE attorneys to adhere to “deport-in-all-cases culture”); Chi. 
Appleseed Fund for Justice, Reimagining the Immigration Court Assembly Line: 
Transformative Change for the Immigration Justice System 39–48 (2012), available at 
http://www.appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Reimagining-the-
Immigration-Court-Assembly-Line.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (observing 
persistence of ICE’s “deport at all costs” approach in immigration court); ICE Seeks to 
Deport the Wrong People, TRAC Immigration (Nov. 9, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/243/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting between 
one-third and one-quarter of ICE’s deportation requests are rejected by immigration 
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Maricopa County, Arizona, for example, where DOJ also found evidence 
of serious police abuses, there is no indication that Trial Attorneys 
suppressed tainted evidence, declined to pursue deportation 
proceedings, or took any kind of discretionary remedial actions.28 Until 
very recently, Sheriff Joseph Arpaio continued to aggressively enforce 
state and federal immigration laws.29 And though the sheriff’s own 
federal immigration authority has been revoked, ICE continues to screen 
Maricopa jails for deportable detainees.30  
These divergent approaches in the agency’s regional field offices 
reflect the significant discretionary power that government attorneys 
wield in implementing prosecutorial and administrative powers. But the 
Charlotte attorneys’ apparent deviation from ICE’s typically unflinching 
zeal in pursuing immigration enforcement actions raises an important 
question: Are ICE prosecutors legally justified in dropping deportation 
                                                                                                                 
courts); see also Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A 
Case Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory 
Environment, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 433, 445–57 (1992) (reporting in study of 
149 asylum hearings, ICE attorneys took oppositional stance in every case). 
28. Just three weeks after the DOJ issued its Maricopa County findings and DHS 
terminated Sheriff Arpaio’s authority to enforce federal immigration law, ICE attorneys 
from the Eloy, Arizona, district office presented a fifty-page Powerpoint to the Maricopa 
County Attorney’s Office with detailed guidance on how to charge criminal violations of 
Arizona law in ways that make it easier for ICE to secure deportations. See Stephen 
Lemons, Bill Montgomery’s Smoking Gun: ICE PowerPoint Shows Monty’s Minions How 
to Deport More Immigrants, Phx. New Times: Feathered Bastard (Feb. 15, 2013, 1:57 PM), 
http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/bastard/2013/02/bill_montgomerys_smoking_gun_i 
.php (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Dominique J. Honea et al., Powerpoint: 
Immigration Consequences of Common Arizona Convictions (Jan. 6, 2012), available at 
http://media.phoenixnewtimes.com/8565705.0.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). The Maricopa County Attorney’s Office has long worked closely with Sheriff 
Arpaio in enforcing federal and state laws against immigrant arrestees. See, e.g., Ray 
Stern, Bill Montgomery Prosecuting Fewer Illegal Immigrants for Smuggling Themselves 
into Country, Phx. New Times: Valley Fever (Nov. 5, 2012, 8:21 AM), http://blogs.phoenix
newtimes.com/valleyfever/2012/11/bill_montgomery_prosecuting_fe.php (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
29. See, e.g., Marisa Franco, Cut Ties Between Maricopa County and ICE, Politic365 
(Mar. 20, 2013, 5:50 PM), http://politic365.com/2013/03/20/cut-ties-between-maricopa-
county-and-ice/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on workplace 
immigration raid conducted by Arpaio’s deputies in March 2013). 
30. See Michael Kiefer, ICE Agents to Do Maricopa County Jail Screening, Ariz. 
Republic (Dec. 19, 2011, 9:55 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/12/19
/20111219ice-agents-do-maricopa-county-jail-screening.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (“The U.S. Department of Homeland Security on Monday announced it will 
send 50 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents to Maricopa County to perform 
immigration screening of county jail inmates.”); see also ICE, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., Activated Jurisdictions 1 (2013), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (showing Secure 
Communities, ICE’s biometric information sharing program, has been activated in 
Maricopa County since January 16, 2009).  
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cases or taking other remedial measures when noncitizens are 
apprehended through unlawful policing? The following sections provide 
two independent bases for answering that question in the affirmative. 
II. EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT UNDERENFORCED 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
A. Scope of Fourth Amendment Protections for Noncitizens 
A preliminary inquiry before considering the government’s 
constitutional responsibilities in immigration enforcement concerns the 
scope of unauthorized noncitizens’ Fourth Amendment rights in this 
country. First, it is helpful to distinguish between the strength of the 
Constitution’s protections at the border and in the country’s interior. As 
recent news events have highlighted, the Fourth Amendment offers little 
protection against intrusive, suspicionless searches of citizens and 
immigrants alike who seek to enter the United States.31 In light of 
national security concerns inherent in guarding the country’s ports of 
entry, the Supreme Court gives the government much wider latitude 
with respect to the reasonableness of searches and seizures at the 
border.32  
In contrast, persons apprehended in the interior United States by 
local and state law enforcement or by federal immigration officers are 
entitled to the full protection of the Fourth Amendment regardless of 
their immigration status. To be sure, some of the language in United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez33 provided fodder for the notion that Fourth 
Amendment protections might be graduated depending upon the 
noncitizen’s immigration status or substantive connections with this 
country.34 The case involved U.S. federal agents’ warrantless search of a 
Mexican citizen’s home, in Mexico, in connection with the murder of a 
                                                 
31. See, e.g., Mark Memmott, U.S. Defends Warrantless Searches of Electronic 
Devices at Border, NPR: The Two-Way (Sept. 10, 2013, 1:05 PM), http://www.npr.org/ 
blogs/thetwo-way/2013/09/10/221040881/government-defends-warrantless-searches-of-
electronic-devices (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
32. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 150 (2004) (upholding 
suspicionless search of gas tank at border); United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 
(9th Cir. 2008) (upholding suspicionless search of laptop at border), abrogated in part by 
United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). See generally Jennifer 
M. Chacón, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 Fordham Urb. L.J. 
129, 134–41 (2010) (discussing scope of Fourth Amendment at border). 
33. 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).  
34. See D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law: Undocumented 
Immigrants and the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 85, 87–95 (2011) (discussing 
this aspect of Verdugo).  
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U.S. drug enforcement agent in that country.35 Verdugo was brought to 
the United States for prosecution, where he asserted the Fourth 
Amendment barred the government from relying on evidence seized in 
the warrantless arrest. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, 
which held that the Constitution does not apply extraterritorially to 
protect property located outside the United States.36 Although that 
ground was sufficient to support the Court’s judgment, then-Justice 
Rehnquist’s plurality opinion also stated that noncitizens in the United 
States only “receive constitutional protections when they have come 
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial 
connections with this country.”37 
Justice Rehnquist’s “substantial connections” language was dicta that 
failed to garner the support of a majority of the Court.38 Accordingly, 
most courts and commentators have found Verdugo irrelevant to the 
Fourth Amendment rights of noncitizens within the United States.39 
Nevertheless, a seed was planted, in some circumstances leading lower 
courts to inquire whether noncitizens asserting unlawful searches or 
seizures have sufficient connections with this country. Most of these 
courts concluded that voluntarily entering the country (even without 
authority) is sufficient to trigger the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment.40  
                                                 
35. 494 U.S. at 262.  
36. Id. at 268–72. See also id. at 274–75 (“At the time of the search, he was a citizen 
and resident of Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States, and the place 
searched was located in Mexico. Under these circumstances, the Fourth Amendment has 
no application.”). 
37. Id. at 271 (emphasis added). Although Justices Kennedy, White, O'Connor, and 
Scalia joined Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, courts and commentators have referred to the 
Court’s opinion as a plurality opinion because “Justice Kennedy’s concurrence diverged 
substantially from the reasoning of the Court . . . even rejecting the fundamental line of 
reasoning employed by the Court . . . ”. Núñez, supra note 34, at 88 n.8 (citing 
commentators and courts referring to Verdugo as a plurality opinion). See also id. at 100-
101 (parsing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence). 
38. Although Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s opinion, his separate concurrence 
rejected much of Justice Rehnquist’s analysis, and notably emphasized that “[i]f the 
search had occurred in a residence within the United States, I have little doubt that the 
full protections of the Fourth Amendment would apply.” 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). See also Núñez, supra note 34, at 100-101 (parsing Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Verdugo). 
39. Núñez, supra note 34, at 102–05 (collecting cases and academic commentary).  
40. See id. at 105–07 (collecting cases). A small handful of lower courts appear to 
require more than just voluntary entry into the country to establish substantial 
connections, see id. at 107–08, while a few others have gone so far as to establish a 
categorical rule that previously deported felons who unlawfully reenter the country 
cannot claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 108–11. 
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The notion that undocumented noncitizens in the interior United 
States might not be able to avail themselves of the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment is at odds with a great deal of controlling precedent. 
First, Supreme Court doctrine dating back to the nineteenth century 
establishes that the Constitution’s criminal procedure protections apply 
to noncitizens based solely on their presence within the United States.41 
Furthermore, there would have been no reason for the Lopez-Mendoza 
Court to consider whether the exclusionary rule should apply in 
immigration proceedings if the respondents did not enjoy Fourth 
Amendment rights in the first place. Indeed, eight Justices in Lopez-
Mendoza agreed that the Fourth Amendment protects undocumented 
noncitizens.42  
Finally, Arizona v. United States43 reinforces the Court’s long-held 
view that all searches and seizures of noncitizens within the country are 
subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Although the Court 
struck down most of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 statute on preemption grounds, 
it declined to find facially unconstitutional section 11-1051(B) (“section 
2(B)”), which requires state officers to make a “‘reasonable attempt . . . 
to determine the immigration status’” of anyone who is lawfully stopped, 
if “‘reasonable suspicion exists that the person . . . is unlawfully present 
                                                 
41. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770–71 (1950) (“[I]n extending 
constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out 
that it was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary 
power to act.”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (“[A]ll persons 
within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by [the 
Fifth and Sixth] [A]mendments . . . .”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) 
(holding protections of Fourteenth Amendment “are universal in their application, to all 
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of 
color, or of nationality”); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1982) (interpreting 
Equal Protection Clause to apply to undocumented noncitizens within U.S. territory); 
United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Once aliens become subject to 
liability under United States law, they also have the right to benefit from [Fourth 
Amendment] protection.”).  
42. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (plurality opinion); id. at 
1051 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 1055 (White, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting); id. 
at 1060 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Moreover, in defining what constitutes an egregious 
constitutional violation for purposes of enforcing the limited judicial exclusionary rule in 
immigration court, numerous courts of appeals confirm the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment in immigration arrests. See, e.g., Cotzojay v. Holder, No. 11-4916-ag, 2013 
U.S. App. LEXIS 15626, at *22 (2d Cir. July 31, 2013) (“[I]t is uncontroversial that the 
Fourth Amendment applies to aliens and citizens alike.”); Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 694 
F.3d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding exclusionary rule should be applied in removal 
proceedings where Fourth Amendment violation is egregious); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 
F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding violation of noncitizen’s Fourth Amendment rights 
insufficiently egregious to warrant exclusionary rule); Gutierrez-Berdin v. Holder, 618 
F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(finding egregious violation). 
43. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
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in the United States.’”44 Nevertheless, the Court clarified that the 
constitutionality of section 2(B) would depend on how the provision was 
enforced in practice, specifically noting that “[d]etaining individuals 
solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional 
concerns” and citing two bedrock Fourth Amendment cases in support 
of this position.45 The Court then explained how the challenged 
provision might be interpreted narrowly to avoid running afoul of the 
Constitution’s prohibition of unlawful searches and seizures.46 Nothing 
in the Court’s decision suggested there might be a different 
constitutional result if the detained noncitizen lacked lawful 
immigration status. 
In cases not subject to border exceptionalism, then, noncitizens are 
entitled to the same Fourth Amendment protections as citizens, even if 
present without authorization.47 Nevertheless, for reasons explained 
below, the Supreme Court has declined to fully enforce compliance with 
the Fourth Amendment in arrests leading to removal proceedings, 
instead sharing that supervisory responsibility with the executive.  
B. Background on Judicial Underenforcement of the Constitution 
Due to concerns about its institutional role, the judiciary sometimes 
refrains from fully enforcing constitutional rights. The literature on 
constitutional underenforcement, developed by scholars such as 
Lawrence Sager in a variety of contexts outside of immigration law, 
explains that the judiciary’s self-imposed institutional limitations on 
                                                 
44. Id. at 2507 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2012)). 
45. Id. at 2509 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009); Illinois v. 
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). 
46. Id. at 2509. 
47. Whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated in any particular situation 
involving the search or seizure of an immigrant is a highly fact-specific inquiry. To be sure, 
the Supreme Court allows race and national origin to be considered—among multiple 
factors—in establishing probable cause sufficient to make an immigration arrest. See, e.g., 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (upholding border area 
checkpoint policy to subject motorists to secondary immigration inspection “largely on 
the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry”); cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873, 884–86 (1975) (holding roving immigration patrol’s sole reliance on “apparent 
Mexican ancestry” of vehicle occupants insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of 
immigration violations). However, that doctrine does not turn on a rule that noncitizens 
have diminished constitutional rights, but rather reflects the explicit assumption that 
sufficient numbers of unauthorized noncitizens, at least in certain parts of the country, 
share “Mexican appearance” (for instance) to make an officer’s perception of that 
characteristic relevant. Id. at 886–87. It bears emphasizing here, however, that the 
Alamance County cases involved targeting Latinos for highway stops and discriminatory 
treatment of Latinos who violated traffic laws as compared with non-Latinos, neither of 
which law enforcement actions are justified under the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment case law. 
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constitutional enforcement do not limit the strength of the 
constitutional norm itself.48 Consequently, theorists argue that the 
political branches remain responsible for respecting and enforcing the 
full extent of the underenforced constitutional provision.49 
In a number of situations, which typically involve complex political 
choices by elected officials, the judiciary declines to fully enforce the 
Constitution. For instance, while the political question doctrine counsels 
courts to refrain from inquiring whether certain challenged government 
conduct violates the Constitution, that deference says nothing about 
whether the Constitution has in fact been violated.50 Other examples of 
judicial reluctance to intrude on the political branches’ policy choices, 
even where constitutional rights are implicated, include lawsuits against 
executive officers or governments, which are subject to immunity 
doctrines of institutional deference.51 More provocatively, Professor 
Sager also argues that rational basis review of equal protection 
challenges to economic regulations says nothing about whether the 
Constitution prohibits only irrational policy judgments, and instead 
merely exhibits the Court’s desire to give the political branches 
breathing room when making policy judgments.52 
                                                 
48. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes 84–92 (2004) [hereinafter 
Sager, Plainclothes]; Russell M. Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment: The 
Prosecutor’s Role, 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1) (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (“When a right is institutionally underenforced, the 
political branches must enforce the full breadth of the constitutional norm and not 
merely its judicially-enforced shadow.”); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal 
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1220–21 (1978) 
[hereinafter Sager, Fair Measure] (“[C]onstitutional norms which are underenforced by 
the federal judiciary should be understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual 
limits, and federal judicial decisions which stop short of these limits should be understood 
as delineating only the boundaries of the federal courts’ role in enforcing the norm . . . 
.”); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 
113, 128–30 (1993) (explaining “constitutional law, as developed by the Supreme Court, 
reflects in part the Court’s views of its own institutional capacities” and accordingly might 
differ from constitutional interpretation by executive branch).  
49. Sager, Plainclothes, supra note 48, at 88, 91–94, 116; Sager, Fair Measure, supra 
note 48, at 1227–28; see also Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the 
Executive Branch, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189, 1225 (2006) (“Thus, when institutional or 
other factors inhibit robust judicial enforcement of a particular constitutional provision, it 
falls to the executive (and legislative) branch to enforce the provision more fully.”). 
50. Sager, Plainclothes, supra note 48, at 90–91. 
51. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding states are entitled to 
sovereign immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 809 (1982) (explaining qualified 
immunity standard for certain government officials). 
52. See Sager, Plainclothes, supra note 48, at 115–16 (“[T]he extravagant 
permissibility of [rational basis review] is in significant measure the consequence of self-
conscious deference to state legislatures and to Congress.”); Sager, Fair Measure, supra 
note 48, at 1215–20. 
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The takeaway is that the judiciary’s prudentially imposed limits on 
its power to enforce the Constitution do not excuse the political 
branches’ shared responsibility to uphold the underenforced 
provisions.53 The President and all subordinate members of the 
executive branch take an oath to “preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution.”54 This shared duty suggests that in situations where 
institutional factors inhibit robust judicial guardianship of the 
Constitution, the executive branch’s obligation to ensure full 
enforcement is actually elevated. An Office of Legal Counsel opinion 
authored by Walter Dellinger in 1996 expressed this counterbalancing 
dynamic: 
The judiciary is limited, properly, in its ability to enforce the 
Constitution, both by Article III’s requirements of jurisdiction 
and justiciability and by the obligation to defer to the political 
branches in cases of doubt or where Congress or the President 
has special constitutional responsibility. In such situations, the 
executive branch’s regular obligation to ensure, to the full 
extent of its ability, that constitutional requirements are 
respected is heightened by the absence or reduced presence of 
the courts’ ordinary guardianship of the Constitution’s 
requirements.55 
As David Strauss explains, it would be “circular buck-passing” for the 
executive branch to water down its own constitutional obligations by 
incorporating the Court’s lenient scrutiny.56 Of course, the 
appropriate means by which the executive should ensure that the 
Constitution is respected will depend on the particular provision at 
issue.57  
 
                                                 
53. Sager, Plainclothes, supra note 48, at 88, 93–94, 116; Sager, Fair Measure, supra 
note 48, at 1221; see also Gold, supra note 48 (manuscript at 8) (“The executive and 
legislative branches remain charged with enforcing the full breadth of an underenforced 
constitutional norm and not solely its judicially-enforceable component.”). 
54. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). This oath “is a 
solemn undertaking, a binding of the person to the cause of constitutional government, 
an expression of the individual’s allegiance to the principles embodied in that 
document.” In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 
55. The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 
Op. O.L.C. 124, 180 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
56. Strauss, supra note 48, at 128–29; see also Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision 
Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 55 (“If the political branches parrot the 
courts’ lenient scrutiny, everyone has deferred to everyone else, and nobody has done the 
full-fledged constitutional analysis.”). 
57. Morrison, supra note 49, at 1225–26.  
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C. Underenforced Constitutional Rights in Immigration Arrests 
Case law with respect to the application of the Fourth Amendment 
to immigration arrests presents a textbook example of shared 
constitutional responsibility between the judiciary and the executive. As 
noted above, in 1984 the Supreme Court decided INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
which presented the question whether the exclusionary rule should 
apply to suppress evidence in immigration proceedings that immigration 
agents secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment.58 The Court 
applied the framework set out in United States v. Janis,59 weighing the 
perceived deterrence benefits against the likely social costs of extending 
the exclusionary rule to immigration proceedings.60 On the deterrence 
side, the Court noted several factors suggesting little benefit to imposing 
judicial suppression of tainted evidence. First, the majority surmised that 
even when the Fourth Amendment has been violated, there will often be 
sufficiently attenuated evidence of deportability.61 Second, the Court 
found that because most noncitizens put into deportation proceedings at 
that time opted for voluntary departure without exercising their rights to 
a hearing (this is no longer the case62), arresting officers would be 
unlikely to shape their conduct in anticipation of the exclusion of 
evidence.63 The Court also found that the potential availability of 
alternative remedies, such as declaratory relief, undercut the need for 
use of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent of unconstitutional behavior 
in immigration enforcement.64  
What the majority found “most important,” however, was the 
immigration agency’s “own comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth 
Amendment violations by its officers.”65 The Court catalogued the 
agency’s regulations governing stops, interrogations, and arrests, its 
trainings and disciplinary procedures for immigration officers, and a 
                                                 
58. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
59. 428 U.S. 433, 459–60 (1976). 
60. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041–50. 
61. Id. at 1043. 
62. See Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, TRAC Immigration, 
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_proctime_outcome.php 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Sept. 2013) (showing in fiscal year 
2012, for example, cases in which noncitizens were granted voluntary departure 
accounted for only 26,499 of 206,323 completed immigration court matters). 
63. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044. 
64. Id. at 1045. 
65. Id. at 1044. 
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DOJ policy in effect at that time, which provided for administrative 
exclusion of evidence seized through intentionally unlawful conduct.66  
The Court then identified two principal costs of applying the 
exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings. First, where suppression 
of evidence of deportability leads to a successful termination of the 
proceedings, the rule would facilitate the noncitizen’s continuing 
violation of immigration laws.67 Second, adjudication of Fourth 
Amendment violations would bog down the “deliberately simple” and 
“streamlined” administration of immigration laws.68 While the majority 
lamented that the Fourth Amendment rights of noncitizens might be 
violated,69 it concluded that the balance between costs and benefits 
weighed against application of the exclusionary rule in deportation 
proceedings.70 And a critical driver of this conclusion was the Court’s 
perception that “the INS has already taken sensible and reasonable steps 
to deter Fourth Amendment violations by its officers, and this makes the 
likely additional deterrent value of the exclusionary rule small.”71 
The majority opinion ends with the following passage, which leaves 
little doubt that the Court’s decision not to apply the exclusionary rule 
in the context of immigration arrests rested on self-imposed limits to 
judicial enforcement of the Fourth Amendment, delegating 
precautionary and remedial measures for run-of-the-mill violations to the 
political branches: “‘There comes a point at which courts, consistent with 
their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to 
law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of 
the Executive and Legislative Branches.’ That point has been reached 
here.”72 Lopez-Mendoza can thus be seen as an example of judicial 
reluctance to shoulder the full burden of supervising compliance with 
                                                 
66. Id. at 1044–45. 
67. Id. at 1046–47. The Court contrasted this result with the effect of suppressing 
evidence in criminal proceedings, where the crime typically is not a continuing one. Id. As 
the Court’s more recent decisions recognize, however, immigration status is complex and 
often in transition. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012) 
(noting “significant complexities involved in enforcing federal immigration law, including 
the determination whether a person is removable”). 
68. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1048–50.  
69. Id. at 1046 (“Important as it is to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all 
persons, there is no convincing indication that application of the exclusionary rule in civil 
deportation proceedings will contribute materially to that end.”); see also id. at 1050 
(plurality opinion) (“We do not condone any violations of the Fourth Amendment that 
may have occurred in the arrests of respondents . . . .”). 
70. Id. at 1050 (majority opinion).  
71. Id.  
72. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Janus, 428 U.S. 
433, 459 (1976)).  
2013] Policing the Immigration Police 195 
  
the Constitution. The Court acknowledged the applicability and 
importance of the Fourth Amendment in the context of immigration 
arrests, but for jurisprudential reasons shared responsibility with the 
executive branch to enforce that right, requiring imposition of a 
judicially supervised exclusionary rule only in egregious cases.73 
It is not particularly novel to observe that the Supreme Court has 
delegated significant enforcement responsibility for violations of 
constitutional criminal procedure rights to the executive branch.74 With 
respect to the Fourth Amendment in particular, Russell Gold argues that 
because the Court gradually constricted the scope of the exclusionary 
rule in criminal prosecutions for institutional rather than analytic 
reasons, it left intact the executive branch’s responsibility to uphold the 
fuller breadth of the Constitution’s search and seizure protections as 
established in the Court’s earlier precedents.75 Despite the territory 
already covered by other scholars, however, there is profit in examining 
the implications of judicial constitutional underenforcement of the 
Fourth Amendment for the immigration enforcement system.  
Many commentators have argued that the Supreme Court should 
revisit its holding in Lopez-Mendoza and judicially enforce the 
                                                 
73. The plurality portion of O’Connor’s opinion implied a possible exception to the 
general inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in cases involving “egregious violations of 
Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental 
fairness.” Id. (plurality opinion). The egregiousness exception has been adopted by a 
number of courts of appeals. See Elizabeth A. Rossi, Revisiting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza: Why 
the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in Deportation Proceedings, 44 
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 477, 526–30 (2013) (examining differences among circuit 
courts with respect to egregious violations exception). 
74. See, e.g., Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure, 
103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 407, 433 (2013) (explaining Court’s Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule decisions are best explained in light of institutional discomfort with 
supervising procedural violations in criminal context); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. 
Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 
Minn. L. Rev. 251, 255–57 (1975) (explaining under Supreme Court’s “fragmentary” 
conception of criminal prosecution, Fourth Amendment directly regulates only executive 
branch, abjuring judicial intervention except where police violations are constitutionally 
intolerable). See generally Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting 
Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1575 (2001) (discussing means by which Supreme Court invites political branches to 
collaborate in protecting constitutional values in criminal procedure and other areas of 
law).  
75. Gold, supra note 48 (manuscript at 20–21). Gold summarizes this doctrine as 
establishing that, regardless of the level of judicial intervention, the government should 
not benefit “from an illegal search or seizure by using not-sufficiently-attenuated fruits of 
the poisonous tree against the victim of the constitutional violation for non-impeachment 
purposes.” Id. (manuscript at 21). 
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exclusionary rule in removal hearings.76 To be sure, the key deterrence 
and cost assumptions the Court relied upon to reach its decision in 1984 
no longer appear to be accurate.77 But it is critical to recognize that, 
although the Supreme Court made a prudential decision in Lopez-
Mendoza to limit the exclusionary remedy in immigration proceedings to 
egregious Fourth Amendment violations, that decision did not diminish 
the scope of the constitutional right itself. If anything, the judiciary’s 
institutional deference in this area only heightens the executive branch’s 
corresponding responsibility to ensure its enforcement actions do not 
rely on or sanction unconstitutional arrests.  
Seen in this light, the Charlotte ICE Trial Attorneys’ decisions to 
administratively close proceedings against noncitizens whose rights were 
violated by the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office appropriately reflected 
their role, as executive branch officials, to ensure that the government 
does not benefit from violations of the Constitution at any point in the 
immigration enforcement process.78 That ICE declined to pursue 
deportation—as opposed to suppressing evidence of deportability—
reflects the executive’s freedom to fashion different remedial actions 
than those employed by the judiciary as it shares implementation of the 
Fourth Amendment in immigration enforcement.79  
                                                 
76. See, e.g., Chacón, A Diversion of Attention, supra note 5, at 1624–27; Stella 
Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the 
Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 Wis. 
L. Rev. 1109, 1115; Rossi, supra note 73, at 483–84; Immigrant Rights & Immigration 
Enforcement, supra note 5, at 1657.  
77. See, e.g., Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, supra note 5, at 1649–
55 (arguing, inter alia, that Court after Arizona v. United States now recognizes unlawful 
immigration presence to be civil offense and describing how voluntary departure rate has 
significantly fallen since Lopez-Mendoza); see also Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 
271–82 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that its conclusions 
“‘might change, if there developed reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations . . 
. were widespread,’” and remanding for further consideration of that issue) (quoting 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050). 
78. For further discussion regarding the substantial integration of state and local law 
enforcement in contemporary immigration enforcement, see supra notes 9–14; infra 
notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
79. In immigration court, termination of proceedings is often a practical 
consequence of suppressing or excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence, because 
in many cases the government’s best or only evidence of removability is the noncitizen’s 
admission or other not-sufficiently-attenuated poisonous fruit related to statements the 
noncitizen made when arrested. Accordingly, declining to pursue removal at an early 
juncture will often be a better use of ICE’s limited resources than administratively 
suppressing evidence but forging ahead with prosecution. For a thorough consideration 
of the means by which the Supreme Court has invited the political branches to collaborate 
in protecting constitutional values, including through alternate remedies than those 
employed by the judiciary, see Coenen, supra note 74; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The 
Constitution and Criminal Procedure 43–45 (1997) (suggesting legislative, executive, and 
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Additionally, by refusing to proceed with removal proceedings 
against targets of unlawful police discrimination, the Trial Attorneys may 
incentivize North Carolina law enforcement to respect the Constitution 
in the first instance. If states and counties that play a part in federal 
immigration enforcement actually wish to see the noncitizens they 
apprehend deported, exercising favorable discretion in these cases 
should deter state and local police enforcing immigration law from 
employing unlawful policing practices against noncitizens.80 To be sure, 
some states have indicated that their goal in targeting noncitizens for 
immigration enforcement is simply to encourage them to leave or 
refrain from entering the state.81 If one takes this social control objective 
at face value, an increased refusal by ICE to seek deportation in 
particular cases may have little overall deterrent effect, since state or 
local governments could reasonably assume that noncitizens in fear of 
arrest or harassment are not likely to factor potential prosecutorial 
discretion in future immigration proceedings into their decisions about 
where to live. Still, at present, law enforcement officers throughout the 
country, whether state or federal, have little incentive to respect the 
Constitution when stopping noncitizens they suspect or hope might be 
deportable. While complete deterrence may not be possible, it is 
certainly possible for the government to create and reinforce incentives 
for the police to adhere to the Constitution when they apprehend 
noncitizens.  
At bottom, ICE’s decision to exercise favorable discretion in the 
Alamance County cases demonstrates that the application of remedial 
measures in immigration court to address unlawful arrests by federal or 
local authorities need not wait for Lopez-Mendoza to be overruled or 
further legislation to be enacted. This conclusion has implications for 
other ICE prosecutors who wish to embrace their responsibility to 
protect the constitutionality of the immigration enforcement process 
                                                                                                                 
judicial regimes each have different roles in enforcing right of people to be secure from 
unreasonable searches and seizures).  
80. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 48 (manuscript at 2–3) (discussing role of 
prosecutorial discretion in discouraging violations of Fourth Amendment by police); 
Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
665, 706 (1970) (describing how Toronto police modified their behavior in response to 
prosecutorial suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence); David Alan Sklansky, Is the 
Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 567, 580–81 (2008) (describing 
correlation between likelihood that unconstitutional evidence will be excluded and 
police’s adherence to Constitution). 
81. For example, the explicit stated purpose for Arizona’s S.B. 1070 was to 
“discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by 
persons unlawfully present in the United States” and to cause immigrant “attrition 
through enforcement.” Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 
113, § 1, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 450. 
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where there is reason to believe noncitizens were apprehended through 
violations of the Fourth Amendment. 
III. AGENCY GUIDELINES ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
This Part considers whether the remedial actions taken by the 
Charlotte Trial Attorneys in the unlawful policing cases comport with 
their discretionary authority. As in any massive enforcement scheme 
where resource constraints allow officials to process only a tiny fraction 
of the total number of persons eligible for benefits and sanctions, 
discretion is inherent in the immigration removal system.82 Additionally, 
the agency has had various written prosecutorial discretion policies in 
place since at least the 1970s.83 While racial profiling or other unlawful 
policing tactics are not specifically discussed in the agency’s current 
policy memoranda, taking such factors into account is in line with 
several of the agency’s guidelines for the exercise of favorable discretion. 
On June 17, 2011, ICE Director John Morton issued a 
memorandum (“Morton Memo”) setting forth guidelines on the use of 
prosecutorial discretion to close low-priority immigration matters.84 The 
Morton Memo arguably took a step further than the agency’s previous 
policies on prosecutorial discretion by “articulating the expectations for 
and responsibilities of ICE personnel when exercising their discretion.”85 
                                                 
82. See generally Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the 
Individual in Public Services 13–16 (30th anniversary expanded ed. 2010) (1980) 
(discussing inherent discretion in large enforcement bureaucracies). 
83. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the 
DREAM Act, 91 Tex. L. Rev. See Also 59, 66 (2013), http://www.texaslrev.com/in-
defense-of-daca-deferred-action-and-the-dream-act/ (discussing revelation in 1970s of 
immigration agency’s “deferred action” policy then in effect); Letter from Hiroshi 
Motomura, Susan Westerberg Prager Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law, et al., to the 
President of the United States 1–2 (May 28, 2012) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(“In the immigration context, the Executive Branch has exercised its general enforcement 
authority to grant deferred action since at least 1971.”). 
84. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to all Field Office Directors, All Special 
Agents in Charge & All Chief Counsel, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil 
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and 
Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/
prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
85. Bill Ong Hing, The Failure of Prosecutorial Discretion and the Deportation of 
Oscar Martinez, 15 Scholar 437, 452 (2013); see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing 
Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. 
Rev. 1, 15 (2012) (explaining unique aspects of Morton Memo). For examples of previous 
agency guidance on prosecutorial discretion, see Memorandum from Bo Cooper, Gen. 
Counsel, U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Comm’r, U.S. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (n.d.) (on file with the Columbia 
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In particular, the Morton Memo emphasized the responsibility of ICE’s 
Trial Attorneys to consider whether prosecution is warranted under the 
facts in all immigration removal proceedings.86 
The Morton Memo set forth a nonexhaustive list of humanitarian 
factors that ICE officials are to consider in determining whether to 
exercise discretion by declining to pursue deportation.87 The agency’s 
rationale for prudent enforcement discretion was as follows:  
[ICE] has limited resources to remove those illegally in the 
United States. ICE must prioritize the use of its enforcement 
personnel, detention space, and removal assets to ensure that 
the aliens it removes represent, as much as reasonably possible, 
the agency’s enforcement priorities, namely the promotion of 
national security, border security, public safety, and the 
integrity of the immigration system.88 
The memo observed that appropriate prosecutorial discretion is 
warranted at all stages of immigration proceedings, but emphasized that 
earlier discretion is preferable in order to conserve government 
resources.89 A second ICE memo, also issued by John Morton on June 17, 
2011 (“Second Morton Memo”), addressed the specific situation of cases 
involving victims, witnesses to crimes, and plaintiffs in good faith civil 
rights lawsuits, and instructed that “[a]bsent special circumstances or 
aggravating factors, it is . . . against ICE policy to remove individuals in 
the midst of a legitimate effort to protect their civil rights or civil 
liberties.”90 A few months later, ICE issued additional prosecutorial 
                                                                                                                 
Law Review); Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., to All OPLA Chief Counsel (Oct. 24, 2005) (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review); Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, U.S. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv.,  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Regional Directors et al., U.S. Immigration 
& Naturalization Serv.,, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 17, 2000) (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review); Memorandum from Julie L. Myers, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to All Field Office Directors and All 
Special Agents in Charge, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. (Nov. 7, 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
86. Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 84, at 3. 
87. Id. at 4–5. Positive factors include the noncitizen’s ties and contributions to the 
community, including family relationships; whether the person has a U.S. citizen or 
permanent resident spouse, child, or parent; whether the person or the person’s spouse is 
pregnant or nursing, or has severe mental or physical illness; and the likelihood of relief 
from removal. Id. at 4. Negative factors weighing against discretion include whether the 
person poses a national security or public safety concern; the person’s immigration 
history, including any prior removal, outstanding order of removal, prior denial of status, 
or evidence of fraud; and any criminal history. Id. at 4–5. 
88. Id. at 2. 
89. Id. at 5. 
90. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to All Field Office Directors et al., U.S. 
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discretion documents, including a memorandum from Peter Vincent, 
ICE’s Principal Legal Advisor, which specified that each Chief Counsel 
field office should focus on criteria from the Morton Memo when 
determining whether incoming cases warrant a favorable exercise of 
discretion.91 
None of these agency prosecutorial discretion documents 
specifically enumerates unlawful arrest as a basis for declining to pursue 
removal. Nevertheless, exercising favorable discretion in cases that arise 
out of unconstitutional policing practices falls within the spirit of several 
of the agency’s guidelines. First, as noted above, the Second Morton 
Memo specified that ICE should not seek to deport persons pursuing 
legitimate civil rights complaints.92 Although plaintiffs in civil rights 
lawsuits warrant “[p]articular attention,” the memo did not limit 
discretion to that circumstance, suggesting that, absent “serious adverse 
factors,” the agency prioritizes vindication of constitutional rights 
violations over deportation.93 While noncitizens whose rights have been 
violated may not attempt to file civil rights lawsuits for a variety of 
reasons,94 ICE prosecutors may have other grounds upon which to assess 
noncitizens’ good faith constitutional claims, such as affidavits,95 
                                                                                                                 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Prosecutorial Discretion: 
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the Columbia Law Review). 
91. Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. 
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in any circumstance.” Id. at 3. 
92. Morton, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs, 
supra note 90, at 2. 
93. Id. 
94. See Margulies, supra note 18, at 321–23 (describing barriers to civil rights suits by 
noncitizens). 
95. For example, an ICE prosecutor in New Orleans recently agreed to dismissal 
without prejudice after a noncitizen submitted an affidavit detailing constitutional 
violations during his immigration arrest at home, indicating that “upon further review it 
does not further DHS’ interests to pursue this case at this time.” Department’s Motion to 
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prehearing conferences,96 testimony,97 interviews with arresting officers 
or witnesses, and, of course, findings by other agencies such as the DOJ 
of pervasive rights violations.  
Second, suppressing tainted evidence or declining prosecution 
where there have been upstream rights violations promotes one of ICE’s 
expressed agency priorities: protecting the integrity of the immigration 
system.98 “Integrity” is nowhere specifically defined in the agency’s 
prosecutorial discretion guidance materials or in statutes or regulations. 
But remedying and deterring unlawful arrests clearly furthers the 
integrity of the immigration enforcement system under any reasonable 
definition of that term. There may be some difficult cases in which 
different components of systemic integrity are in opposition—as when 
integrity is threatened both by unlawful policing and a particular 
noncitizen’s fraudulent behavior or serial immigration violations—but 
resolution of such tensions is part and parcel of the work of government 
attorneys charged with exercising prudent discretion in their 
enforcement of the law. 
Declining to seek removal against noncitizens whose constitutional 
rights have been violated is all the more necessary to promote the 
integrity of the system in light of the significant, even integral, part that 
state and local law enforcement now play in the immigration 
enforcement system. As described above, technological advances, 
cooperative relationships, and entrepreneurial efforts by states have 
dramatically increased the role of nonfederal actors in the immigration 
enforcement system.99 Indeed, because state and local authorities are 
now responsible for the bulk of the cases flooding an underresourced 
immigration enforcement system,100 they act in essence as agents of the 
                                                                                                                 
Dismiss Without Prejudice, In re [REDACTED] (Dep’t of Justice Mar. 13, 2013) (on file 
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97. See, e.g., In re Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609, 611 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding 
noncitizen may challenge legality of government’s evidence through testimony). 
98. Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 84, at 2. As a practical 
matter, suppressing or excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence in immigration 
court may well lead to termination of the proceedings, because in many cases the 
government’s only evidence of removability consists of the noncitizen’s statements when 
arrested or other not-sufficiently-attenuated poisonous fruit. See supra note 79. 
Accordingly, as the Charlotte Trial Attorneys may have recognized, it is a better use of 
ICE’s resources to decline to pursue removal in such cases at an early juncture than to 
administratively suppress evidence but continue to seek removal. 
99. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text. 
100. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration 
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1819, 
1848–58 (2011) (explaining how developments in immigration enforcement allow state 
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federal government.101 By suppressing evidence or declining to pursue 
deportation against noncitizens arrested through constitutional rights 
violations by state or local law enforcement, ICE thus protects the 
adjudicative system’s integrity.102 
Nothing in the nonexhaustive lists of positive and negative 
discretionary factors set forth in the ICE guidance documents suggests 
that the agency’s attorneys lack the authority to decline to pursue cases 
in which there have been unlawful enforcement actions at the arrest 
stage, at least in cases not falling within a high-priority category for 
removal (because, for example, of significant criminal history).103 As a 
practical matter, law enforcement stops that result only in civil 
deportation proceedings typically will not involve noncitizens with 
serious criminal histories, multiple immigration violations, or other 
circumstances suggesting a threat to public safety.104 The available data 
appear to bear this assumption out, as the vast majority of noncitizens 
referred for deportation through state and local law enforcement have 
either no criminal history or only one or two misdemeanor 
convictions.105 In short, while difficult judgment calls will undoubtedly 
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arise, many cases in which noncitizens are apprehended through 
unchecked rights violations will fall outside the agency’s high-priority 
targets for removal. Thus, ICE Trial Attorneys will frequently be within 
their discretionary authority to dismiss those cases without running afoul 
of other prosecutorial discretion guidelines. 
CONCLUSION 
ICE prosecutors wield significant enforcement discretion as 
gatekeepers to the adjudicative component of a massive enforcement 
apparatus. By declining to seek removal in many of the Alamance 
County cases, the Charlotte Trial Attorneys employed this discretion in 
ways that protect the overall integrity of the deportation system and that 
police the immigration enforcement efforts of law officers. These 
remedial actions can be justified as part of the executive branch’s shared 
responsibility to uphold the constitutional rights of those it seeks to 
subject to deportation or as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
pursuant to specific agency authority.  
It remains to be seen whether other ICE prosecutors will follow suit. 
But unless and until the Supreme Court revisits the prudence of a 
judicially imposed exclusionary rule in immigration court, prosecutorial 
discretion has a significant role to play in deterring constitutional 
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Law Review) (showing statistics for arrests under Secure Communities and section 287(g) 
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